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Introduction
The discussion that follows is largely extracted from two chapters of a 
book we are currently writing. Other than rehearsing some familiar ar-
guments and replies from the Kripke/Putnam/Burge critique of the tra-
ditional Frege/Russell/Wittgenstein views on names and predicates, its 
main contributions are, fi rst, to introduce a novel way of individuating 
tokens of the same expression, (what we call “articulations”) second, to 
then revise standard views on deference, (as this notion is understood 
to pertain to securing access to meaning for potentially ignorant, and 
confused agents in the externalist tradition going back to Putnam and 
Burge) and lastly, to emphasize the often confl ated distinction between 
disambiguation and meaning fi xing. Our line on deference is that it 
478 U. Stojnić and E. Lepore, Expressions and their Articulations
is not, and should not be conceived as, an intentional mental act, but 
rather indicates an historical chain of antecedent tokenings of the 
same expression. What any of these claims and distinctions amount to 
should be clear in what follows.
1. Names, articulations and naming
Suppose you pick up a name in a casual conversation, say, simply by 
hearing a group of interlocutors using it. Your interlocutors may have 
been using the name for a particular individual for some time, but for 
you it is novel. Should you opt to use the name in order to try to name 
the same individual as your interlocutors, it might be that whatever 
success you achieve with your use of the name piggybacks on whatever 
success your interlocutors had with their uses of the same name. That 
is to say, your success seems predicated on your deferring to the speak-
ers who exposed you to the name.
Here is a simple illustration of how easy it is to pick up a name:
 A says: Napoleon was a famous military leader.
 B asks: Was Napoleon born in the 15th century?
 A replies: No! He was not!
B’s success in naming Napoleon is predicated on deference to A. B has 
never been exposed to Napoleon’s name before.
It might turn out that your interlocutors’ own success also relies 
on deference to whomever they picked up the name from, and so on 
and so on through a network of users extending all the way back to 
an introduction of the name, where, we might presume, a connection 
between the name and whichever individual it names was somehow 
fi rst forged. Put differently, by virtue of your deference to whomever 
fi rst exposed you to the name, you thereby enter into a network of us-
ers, all tied together by deference to individuals who fi rst exposed them 
to the name—a network that stretches all the way back to the name’s 
introduction.
Of course, everything we’ve said so far about the establishment 
of, and successful inclusion in, a network of interlocutors leaves com-
pletely open how exactly (or even whether) an individual came to be 
the bearer of that name in the fi rst place, that is, everything we’ve 
said so far leaves open the philosophical question of what, if anything, 
is “the semantic glue to stick our words onto their referents” (Lewis 
1984: 221). That is obviously an interesting and important philosophi-
cal question, and it is one that has occupied the dogged attention of 
generations of meta-semanticists, but we don’t know its answer and, 
for our present purposes, we don’t have to. And so, it will not be our 
focus here. Instead, ours will be on the network itself, and what its 
existence suggests about the constitution of successful uses of a name, 
and in general, of language. This investigation requires answers to (at 
least) two questions:
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1. What must a speaker know or do in order to successfully token/
articulate a particular name on an occasion of use?
2. What must a speaker know or do in order to successfully apply 
that use of that name to a particular individual?
We note that, while we begin our discussion focusing on proper names, 
we are ultimately interested in questions as they apply to expressions 
generally: what does it take for a speaker to successfully token any 
expression, and what does it take for this token to have a successful 
application? We will turn to these questions in sections 3 and 4 below. 
With respect to both questions (1) and (2), it should be obvious 
(though it is not clear that early proponents of deference acknowledged 
or focused on both features of linguistic usage) that successful token-
ing of a name and naming can occur even in the face of widespread 
error about, and ignorance of, not only what the name names but also 
the name itself. For example, a proper name may, and indeed, surely 
often is, likely to admit of many different sorts of articulations, both 
statically and dynamically. After all, it can be written, typed, spoken or 
signed, inter alii. And in any one of these media, there invariably is a 
high degree of fl exibility for how it can be tokened; e.g., in how it can be 
spelled or pronounced.1 Further, it may change its canonical spelling or 
pronunciation across time or place. And, of course, at any given time, it 
might even misspelled or mispronounced according to whatever stan-
dards are in place—and yet it might still be tokened (Hawthorne and 
Lepore 2011). What, we may ask, can possibly hold all these tokenings 
together as articulations of the same proper name?
This question has received very little careful attention in the lit-
erature. Perhaps, many contributors thought its answer was obvious. 
For example, there is very likely, in normal circumstances, a fact of 
the matter about which expression (that is, in the cases under dis-
cussion, which proper name) the speaker intends to use. Many may 
have thought this intention, by itself, can determine which name is 
being tokened.2 But, of course, this depends on the intention. Suppose 
the speaker intends to use, with a particular articulation, that name 
the speaker picked up in a conversation or in a reading. Then, can we 
conclude that the speaker is using that very name? This view has the 
advantage that, regardless of how much off the mark, or however idio-
syncratic, the speaker’s tokening may (turn out to) be (perhaps, some 
1 We will return below to the question of how much tolerance is permissible 
before a loss of identity.
2 See, for instance, Kaplan (1991; 2011). Kaplan (2011) qualifi es the intention 
view somewhat: there is a certain standard of performance an utterance has to 
satisfy in order to count as a (even bad) performance, rather than non-performance. 
For instance, simply grunting might not qualify as uttering a word. However, 
provided such a standard is satisfi ed, intention suffi ces to determine the identity. 
See also Hawthorne and Lepore (2011) for a critical discussion. Hawthorne and 
Lepore also advocate for a standard that separates performances (even bad ones) 
from non-performances.
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would have it, as we shall discuss below, provided that it meets some 
contextual standard for counting as a performance), or even how con-
fused the speaker’s concomitant beliefs may be about which expression 
is being tokened, the speaker can still succeed in using a particular 
name.
But we have to be careful here. We do not mean to suggest that each 
time someone speaks, they have to explicitly form an intention to use 
the name they picked up from A (where A is the individual who intro-
duced the speaker to the name). Rather, our view is that, somehow or 
other (in ways that perhaps even psycholinguists don’t fully understand 
yet), a speaker selects a name from her (mental) lexicon.3 Of course, 
there is a fact of the matter about who introduced this speaker to the 
name in her lexicon that she is selecting; the name selected is identi-
cal to the name in the mouth—or more precisely, representation—of 
the agent who fi rst introduced the speaker to it. In selecting the term, 
the speaker is, in a sense, deferring to the agent who introduced her to 
the term. But notice, in this way, deference should not be understood 
as the term is typically used, namely, as an active intentional mental 
act, but it is rather de facto—in effect, something that largely passively 
happens to a speaker. Therefore, someone might be mistaken, in the 
sense in which we are using the term, about to whom they are defer-
ring in virtue of their being mistaken about who introduced them to the 
name that they selected. Nevertheless, no matter what, there is still 
an historical fact about who introduced the name into the speaker’s 
(mental) lexicon—who they got the name from.  So, in order to perform 
any utterance, a speaker has only to choose a particular linguistic form, 
one which features a representation of a certain name; given this, there 
is a fact of the matter about which name fi gures in the speaker’s rep-
resentation of an utterance: it is whichever name the speaker selected 
from her lexicon, which is that name that featured in the representa-
tion of whoever introduced the lexical item into the speaker’s mental 
lexicon in the fi rst place (and so forth back to the initial introduction 
of the name). “Deference” in this sense is not an intentional act by the 
speaker to token whichever expression the individual who introduced 
the speaker to the expression tokened. Rather, the speaker intends to 
token some particular expression in his (mental) lexicon (but there is a 
fact of the matter about which tokened expression introduced that lexi-
cal item into the speaker’s (mental) lexicon in the fi rst place).
A different sort of worry arises when there is a departure from an 
accepted conventional norm for the articulation of some expression. 
The greater the degree of departure, the more likely it is that confusion 
will ensue. The further off a spelling or pronunciation is from some 
accepted standard, the less likely the hearer will be able to recognize 
which name is being articulated; and then, there is also the worry that, 
because different names can share a single articulation, a hearer might 
3 For a further, more detailed, development of this point, see Stojnić, ms.
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mistake which name the speaker is tokening. How many individuals do 
we all know whose name is typeset as “John”? But there is an historical 
chain of tokenings ending with the name’s introduction4 that deter-
mines which name is actually being tokened on any given occasion of 
use. The individuation is not a matter of any particular articulatory 
shape (contra Davidson (1979: 90); cf. Hawthorne and Lepore (2011)); 
the bond between a name and its sundry tokenings is secured through 
a community wide network of deference to others about which particu-
lar name is being tokened—despite whatever wide-spread error and 
ignorance surrounds any given usage.5
The epistemological worries concerning how we decide which name 
an articulation is of, we believe, have boundless (defeasible) solutions. 
For example, if we are talking about the butcher shop, and not the pro-
duce stand, then, most likely, the “John” we mean (that is, the name we 
articulated with “John”) is the butcher’s name and not the gardener’s, 
even if both names are articulated with the same pronunciation and 
with the same spelling. This is much like how we go about “disambigu-
ating” uses of “bank”; if the speaker is walking along the river when 
uttering “bank”, we are likely to resolve one way, but if the speaker is 
talking about depositing money when uttering “bank”, we resolve to a 
different expression—the same articulation, but different words.
There probably is no end to how many strategies we might employ 
in going about making these sorts of decisions, even though there is a 
fact of the matter about which decision is correct, and the potential for 
error always exists. This means that a speaker can mispronounce or 
misarticulate a name, while still tokening it, but at the same time the 
audience can be mistaken in “disambiguating” a name: they might be 
misled by the evidence available, taking speakers to have tokened one 
name, when in fact they were tokening another. Such epistemological 
considerations belong to the theory of disambiguation, not the theory of 
meaning (determination), in as much as they delineate the set of cues 
language users use to recognize a particular form as the one that has 
4 In the literature, there is invariably talk of a speaker intending to use a name 
with the same reference as the person’s uses of the name from whom the speaker 
learned the name. (See, e.g., Kripke (1980), inter alia.) We chose to switch over to 
de facto deference talk instead, since (a) requiring the speaker to have such explicit 
intentions, we believe, is requiring too much, and (b) we believe, as already noted 
above, that de facto deference talk can be cashed out independently of intention talk 
(especially, if intentions are understood as beefy propositional attitudes). For more 
on this point, see Stojnić, ms; Stojnić and Lepore, ms.
5 Recall, again, that deference isn’t here understood as an “intention to defer”, 
as a plan to token a certain symbol. Even if someone doesn’t intend to defer to 
X, who introduced them to the term, the tokened symbol will mean whatever it 
meant in the mouth of whom it was acquired from (and so on)—the symbol will be 
de facto deferentially individuated. So, deference is de facto, not deference by plan 
or intention. The speaker simply has to select the expression from her lexicon; the 
individuation, and meaning, of the expression is determined by de facto deference to 
whomever introduced the speaker to the term.
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been uttered, and not to determine how to interpret its meaning (cf. 
Stojnić, Stone, and Lepore, 2013; 2017).
In short, the take-home message so far is that it is all too easy, even 
at the stage of name identifi cation, to confl ate epistemology and meta-
physics, disambiguation and meaning determination, and so, vigilance 
is required in respecting relevant distinctions—in this case, the dis-
tinction between an expression and its articulations. To repeat, though 
many individuals have names typeset as “John,” on any given occasion 
of use there is a fact of the matter about which one of these different 
names is being tokened by an instance of this shared articulation.6 And 
this fact is fi xed by a speaker’s tokening a particular expression, which 
is individuated by de facto deference. In this regard, we reject custom-
ary talk of numerous individuals bearing the same name, as in: “Proper 
names typically have more than one bearer. Thus, a contemporary to-
ken of ‘Aristotle’ might designate the famous philosopher or it might 
designate the late shipping magnate Onassis” (Devitt 2015: 110). We 
think not. There are (at least) two names “Aristotle”. “Aristotle” is am-
biguous, if you like.
This is not to deny that the audience may face hurdles, perhaps, 
for all intents and purposes, insurmountable ones—ones that inspire 
requests for elaboration and assistance—in identifying which name is 
being tokened. Nor it is even to deny that speakers might be confused 
in all sorts of ways about which name they are tokening. (For instance, 
they might erroneously believe that the name they are tokening is 
identical to the name they learned from A, when, in fact, it isn’t.) This 
doesn’t prevent them from either tokening the name, or applying it.
But, no matter how muddy the epistemology becomes, the meta-
physics remains clear. The name being articulated, on any given occa-
sion of use, is determined by de facto deference of the speaker to the 
name acquired fi rst from some other speaker. And so, the answer to 
our fi rst question (which one of us defends further in detail elsewhere 
(Stojnić, ms)) about what speakers must know or do in order to success-
fully token a particular name on an occasion of use is that they needn’t 
know anything; rather, they must do something—namely, token a 
particular expression (select that expression) in their mental lexicon, 
which, in turn, defers (de facto) to the tokening that fi rst exposed the 
speaker to the name; and so on and so on back to its neologism.
We are now ready to turn to our second question about what speak-
ers must know or do in order to successfully apply a name, and, not 
surprisingly, we fi nd that many of the warnings we had to heed about 
misarticulating a name have their echoes in a speaker’s ignorance of, 
and errors in, applying that name. So, suppose that the speaker be-
lieves a name picks out a butcher, when, in fact, it picks out a gardener. 
6 This particular specifi cation of our view assumes that names are not predicates 
(or generic names, in the sense of Kaplan (1990)). But even if it turns out that they 
are, what we have to say about predicates below suffi ces to establish our point about 
de facto deference all over again.
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These sorts of error can persist, and may even be pervasive, and yet 
present no obstacles to successful naming. (If you believe, falsely, that 
“John” picks out a butcher, you will have (successfully) said something 
false when you say “John’s a butcher”.) How is that possible?
Once initially determined (however that is achieved7), successful 
naming can obtain even in the face of confusion and widespread er-
ror, again, both about the name’s identity and its meaning. A use of 
the proper name “Aristotle” names whomever it names, regardless of 
any mistaken beliefs or other misinformation interlocutors carry into 
a conversation where this name is being used. This is because the net-
work of de facto deferential speakers, “stretching back from our uses 
to the fi rst uses of the name to designate Aristotle” (Kripke 1980: 25), 
secures this same naming for current users of the same name (where 
the fact that the same name is being tokened is itself secured through 
a network of de facto deference, as explained earlier).8 Once it is settled 
that a speaker is using the name “Aristotle”, and that this name names 
a particular individual, then the speaker’s use also names that individ-
ual, regardless of how confused or ignorant the speaker is about which 
name is being used and whom or what it names.
All that matters for achieving these results is that someone exposed 
the speaker to that name, and it names some individual (through their 
own network of deference to whomever they picked up the word from); 
more precisely, and keeping in mind our answer to the fi rst question, 
all that matters is that the speaker is tokening the name “Aristotle”. 
So long as the speaker selects the name “Aristotle” from her mental 
lexicon in forming the utterance (where the identity of the expression is 
determined through de facto deference), and thereby, tokens the name 
“Aristotle”, then they name whomever the name “Aristotle” names (if 
anyone) in the network of de facto deference that the speaker is partici-
pating in.9 In this regard, the application of the name is fi xed once the 
name itself is created.
7 Again, we do not care if it’s as a matter of a causal covariance, or a Fregean 
sense, or however a name’s meaning is established. We are interested only in what is 
required of the speaker to count as a user of an expression, and not what is required 
of an expression to have meaning.
8 Again, we are sidestepping important philosophical issues, because we can, 
given our purposes and aims about what, if anything, must be in the head of the 
neologizer of the name. Our interest is in the other members of the network, so 
to speak, and what, if anything, they must know or be connected to in order to 
successfully token, and successfully apply a name. We care at present only about 
how meaning can be exploited by a novice once created.
9 In this regard, we are disagreeing with Kripke that a speaker when he uses a 
name “must ... intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference” (1980: 96). 
If we are right, the intention to use a term (assuming the use is not one whereby 
the expression is introduced and its meaning fi xed) with a particular reference is 
relevant for the identity of the expression uttered, as well as the meaning that 
expression has on the occasion of use.
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We are ready to move on to how we intend to expand the network 
model to other sorts of expressions.
2. Challenges
In Part 1, we tendered answers to two central questions about names 
and naming:
1. What does it take to successfully token/articulate a name?
2. What does it take to successfully use/apply a name, to name 
something?
We have spent some time defending a particular answer to our fi rst 
question. According to us, speakers needn’t know anything in order to 
token an expression. They need to do something: they need to select an 
item in their (mental) lexicon in forming their utterance. Expressions 
in the mental lexicon, in turn, are grounded by de facto deference, and 
so, are individuated by virtue of a causal/historical/social network of 
deference.
With respect to our second question about what speakers must 
know or do in order to successfully apply a name, we noted that many 
of the warnings about misarticulating a name have echoes in a speak-
er’s ignorance and errors in applying that name. Our knowledge might 
be dramatically incomplete (as well as erroneous). Even if all we know 
about Feynman is that he’s a physicist, we can still use “Feynman” to 
refer to a particular physicist, namely, Feynman. Indeed, even if what-
ever minimal information about Feynman we have is incorrect (e.g., 
we think he’s a novelist), we can still use the name “Feynman” to say 
things about Feynman (cf. Kripke (1980)).
Likewise, even if it is commonly assumed that “Godel” picks out the 
man who fi rst proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, “...it is perfectly 
intelligible to suppose that it might be discovered that Godel was not 
the fi rst to prove incompleteness...” (Kripke 1980). But must there be 
some other description whereby we pick out Godel? And, if not, isn’t the 
use of the name by someone so ignorant or misinformed a mere case of 
parroting? That is, if someone doesn’t know anything about Godel at 
all, can she still really use ‘Godel’ to refer to Godel (cf., Dummett 1991: 
Ch. 4)? And if so, does that use count as a successful use?
According to us, what matters is whether someone exposed the 
speaker to a name of an individual. If so, then for all subsequent uses, 
the speaker de facto defers to the exposer with respect to the name. The 
speaker need not know that she does so. More precisely: so long as the 
speaker is tokening the name “Aristotle”, the name names whomever 
it names in the network of deference the speaker is participating in 
(if it names anyone). The speaker de facto defers, because the name is 
grounded via the network.
Not everyone agrees. Dummett, for example, has replies to both the 
argument from error and the argument from ignorance. On our view, 
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if a child is introduced to the name “Newton” with the description “the 
man who discovered that there is a force pulling things to earth,” then, 
even though this gives the child a false belief about Newton, the child 
can still reference Newton with her uses of “Newton”. In this respect, 
therefore, even the description used to fi x the referent needn’t be true 
of individual named. Here Dummett balks, labeling the view—the ‘he-
roic’ course, namely, the view that “…someone who had no more than 
heard the name “Newton” without any means of fi xing its referent, 
without knowing anything at all about its bearer, would nevertheless 
understand it and be capable of using it with the reference commonly 
attached to it” (Dummett 1973: 137, emphasis our own).
Dummett is equally skeptical about the limitlessness of ignorance. 
He writes, “...there are certainly cases in which a proper name is used 
without its user attaching to it anything that Frege would consider a 
sense. If, when I come home, one of my children says to me, “Mr. Cun-
ningham telephoned and asked if you would ring him back”, the child 
may no more know the sense or the reference of the name “Mr. Cun-
ningham”, which, let us suppose, he has never heard before, than does 
a piece of paper on which such a message is written; the child is acting 
merely as a recording apparatus...” (Dummett 1973: 138).
Dummett insists upon replacing the network model with a cluster/
division of labor proposal, according to which, “…what makes it pos-
sible to entertain the possibility that Godel might be discovered not 
to have proved, or not to have been the fi rst to prove, the incomplete-
ness of arithmetic is the fact that there exist other generally accepted 
ways of determining the reference of the name “Godel”. This is always 
the case with any name about whose bearer a good deal is known by 
at least some who use the name; and it is never the case with a name 
about whose bearer practically nothing is known save that it satisfi es 
the description which fi xes the reference of the name” (Dummett 1973: 
139).10
10 Note that in regards to individual speaker’s ignorance, Dummett responds that 
“one of the ways in which it is essential to language that it is a common instrument 
of communication is that there is no sharp line between the case in which a speaker 
makes a fully conscious employment of the sense canonically attached to a word and 
that in which he acts as a recording apparatus. We are able to exploit the fact that a 
word has a generally recognized sense, which may be discovered by standard means, 
even when we have only a partial knowledge of that sense; and we do […]” “[it] is 
not possible that none of those who use a name have any criterion for identifying the 
bearer of the name, that all of the use it with only partial criterion in mind, but with 
the intention of referring to the commonly agreed referent” (Dummett 1973: 139–
40). We caution, again, that is important to separate meaning determination—the 
metaphysical question we can set aside—from successful tokening and application of 
a term. Provided the meaning is fi xed—in whichever way—there is no pre-requisite, 
on our view, on successful tokening or application that any speaker has even partial 
knowledge of the meaning or that they have an intention to refer to a particular 
referent, or defer to a particular community. We will return below to the claim, 
often repeated in the literature, that there has to be someone in the community who 
possesses the relevant linguistic knowledge.
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In this passage lies the seeds of Dummett’s dismissal of the network 
model; he further writes, “Kripke expressly wishes to allow that the 
association with a name of a description which in fact does not apply to 
the person or thing for which the name was originally introduced does 
not deprive that name of reference to that person or thing: it merely re-
veals a false belief about the referent of the name. There is therefore no 
room in Kripke’s account for a shift of reference in the course of a chain 
of communication: the existence of such a chain, accompanied all the 
time by the required intention to preserve reference, must be taken as 
guaranteeing that reference is in fact preserved. Intuitively, however, 
there is no such guarantee: it is perfectly possible that, in the course of 
the chain, the reference has been unwittingly transferred. Once this is 
conceded, the account crumbles away altogether. We are left with this: 
that a name refers to an object if there exists a chain of communica-
tion, stretching back to the introduction of the name as standing for 
that object, at each stage of which there was a successful intention to 
preserve its reference. This proposition is indisputably true; but hardly 
illuminating” (Dumett 1973: 151).
Dummmett’s view is obviously in sharp contrast with our own. And 
there is much in what he says in these quoted passages above that we 
take issue with; for example, his insistence on understanding, and his 
worries about shifting reference, as presenting insuperable problems 
for the network model. Elsewhere, we take on these challenges (Stojnić 
and Lepore, ms; Stojnić, ms). But, for now, it’s best we proceed with our 
own positive view, according to which, to repeat, much like successfully 
tokening a name, successfully using a name doesn’t require speakers to 
know (much of) anything.11
To successfully use a name, a speaker need only token it, i.e., select 
it from his (mental) lexicon. Its meaning (referent) is, in turn, grounded 
11 It is perhaps worth pausing for a moment on the shifting reference problem. 
Since on our account the meaning of an expression (if any) is transferred through a 
network of deference, what do we say of cases of apparent shifts in meaning, as might 
be with, e.g., ‘Madagascar’ (cf. Evans 1973)? If meaning is deferentially transferred 
through a network, then aren’t we bound, via Marco Polo’s mistake, to refer to a part 
of mainland African content with our uses of ‘Madagascar’? While we have no space 
to defend this view here, we maintain that the alleged shifts in meaning are best 
understood as novel acts of neologizing, whereby a new expression is introduced and 
a novel meaning for it might be grounded (Stojnić, ms). Such (re-)baptsims can occur 
either transparently to agents involved, or tacitly (just as any other introduction of a 
novel word can be a conscious effort on the part of the speaker—as when the speaker 
says ‘I’ll name you ‘Alice’’—or can happen without interlocutors realizing they are 
introducing a novel word—as might be with some instances of zero derivation, e.g. 
by uttering “He houdinied his way out of the cell”, without either the speaker or the 
audience realizing “to houdini” is not already a word). Notice that, how meaning 
gets fi xed (if at all) in the re-baptism case, is the same metaphysical question of how 
meaning is fi xed in the baptism case that we do not purport to answer here. What 
is important for our purposes is that the chain of deference only takes one to the 
(nearest) baptism event. That a homonymous expression might have been previously 
introduced with a different meaning is simply irrelevant.
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by de facto deference to the tokening of the name by the member of 
the network from whom the speaker acquired it (and so on). With that 
said, we are now ready to transition from proper name expressions to 
predicative ones.
3. Predicates and their tokenings/articulations 
and predications
As in the case of names, we have two central questions:
1.  What does it take to successfully token/articulate a predicate?
2.  What does it take to successfully use/apply it (e.g., to ascribe a 
property)?
In brief, our main pitch is that the shift from names to predicates is 
seamless since, mostly, what goes for names goes for predicates—with 
some qualifi cation. And so, our answers to the two questions driving 
this discussion will look familiar. We begin with common nouns.
The common noun “water” is not a name, but, much like one, at 
some point, and in some manner—perhaps, by speaking it—it was in-
troduced into the language. And, in some manner (perhaps, by speak-
ing it while pointing at a particular body of liquid, though, again, the 
details do not concern us), let’s assume, its extension is fi xed (and so, it 
is settled what “water” means). (As in the case of names, we don’t re-
ally care about how exactly “water” was introduced, or how its meaning 
was fi xed.)
Of course, there are differences between names and common nouns. 
For one, the extension of “water” is not what it names. The neologist 
who introduced the common noun was not intending to name a par-
ticular body of liquid, but instead might have been pointing at it as 
an exemplar of a property, and somehow thereby fi xed its extension to 
include whatever it is true of. (Again, this part of the story is not our 
focus.)
There are still shared key features, despite these differences. We 
note the obvious, namely, just as with a name, a common noun can be 
spelled and pronounced in various ways, and, as a matter of fact, it has 
been across times and places. And, much like a name, it can be, and has 
been, misarticulated, if by that is meant the term can be successfully 
used (tokened) even when its use on a given occasion departs from its 
customary articulations. This is, indeed, a familiar, and perfectly gen-
eral, lexical phenomenon, not isolated to names and predicates.
To illustrate, consider the distinct words “bear” and “bare”. Were 
someone to write, “Bare with me!”, our reaction would not be to ascribe 
a new meaning to an old word (“bare”), but, rather, to say the speaker 
misarticulated another old word (“bear”). The speaker did request the 
addressee to bear with the speaker, but misspelled the word “bear” as 
“bare”—a misarticulation. And so, the speaker can be taken not only to 
mean for the addressee to bear with the speaker, but also even to have 
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said it. (It is also possible, though less likely, that the speaker did, in 
fact, token “bare”, perhaps because she mistakenly believed that “to 
bare” means to bear. Either of these mistakes are possible, but cru-
cially, neither involves assigning a new meaning to the term “bare” (cf. 
Kripke (1977) on speaker reference).)
The difference between expressions and their articulations played a 
key role in our answer to the fi rst question about names: namely, what 
does it take to token a name? So, our answer here to our fi rst question 
about tokening common nouns is going to be the same as the one we 
gave in the case of names.
Which expression a speaker is tokening depends, on our current 
account, on who, so to speak, introduced the expression into the cur-
rent speaker’s (mental) lexicon; if that prior speaker tokened the word 
“bear,” when (perhaps unwittingly) introducing the current speaker to 
the word which she is now tokening, then that is the word the cur-
rent speaker is tokening, even if she articulates it as “bare”. Or more 
precisely, if she selects the expression “bear” in her mental lexicon, 
where this is the expression she was introduced to by another speaker’s 
tokening of “bear” (and so on), then she will have tokened this expres-
sion, even if she (mis)articulated it as “bare”. So, on our account, one 
could be tokening, and so, saying that the addressee should bear with 
the speaker, even if she is misarticulating this as “bare with me”. No-
tice, though, we are not saying the content asserted—what is said in 
the Gricean sense—is determined by speaker intentions. In particu-
lar, we are not endorsing Intentionalism about what—which content—
the speaker asserts when speaking. Rather, which linguistic form the 
speaker uses depends on which expression she articulates. Which ex-
pression she articulated depends on which expression she tokened, i.e., 
which expression in her mental lexicon she selected in forming her ut-
terance.
The situation is the same as in the case of names. When the speaker 
says, “Godel is smart”, that the speaker is tokening the name “Godel,” 
rather than, say, “Smith”, is a matter of which expression the speaker is 
actually tokening. But that doesn’t mean it’s up to the speaker’s inten-
tions whom “Godel” names. That is a matter of the meaning of “Godel”. 
A speaker can token “Godel” mistakenly, thinking it named Smith, or 
mistakenly articulate another name, e.g., “Smith” as “Godel”. But nei-
ther fact makes it the case that the meaning of the name “Godel” is up 
to the speaker’s intentions.
The point is perhaps even easier to see when the focus shifts to con-
text-sensitive items. So, consider an utterance of “She is happy”. That 
the speaker is using the third
 
person singular female pronoun “she”, 
rather than, say, the male one “he”, or the proper name “John”, or any 
other expression, is a matter of which expression is actually being to-
kened. But whom “she” picks out is not a matter of whom the speaker 
intends to pick out with the expression she is tokening; for example, if 
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pointing at Mary, “she” will pick out Mary, even if she intends some-
one else (see Stojnić at al, 2013, 2017). Further, one can assert “She 
is happy,” pointing at a man, because one mistakenly misarticulated 
the third person singular male pronoun “he”. In this case, the speaker 
doesn’t mistakenly believe the man is a female; she just misarticulates 
the word. (This, we take it, is a common misarticulation for non-native 
speakers of English whose fi rst languages lack gendered pronouns.) 
But one can assert “She is happy” tokening the third
 
person singular 
female pronoun “she” because one mistakenly thinks of the man that 
he is female. In neither of these cases is it a matter of the speaker’s 
intentions fi xing the referent of “he”.
It is worthwhile comparing these two types of error. In the fi rst case, 
the speaker said of a male that he is happy; in the second, the speaker 
said nothing at all, or something false. In the fi rst case, the speaker is 
making an articulatory error; in the second, the speaker is making a 
non-linguistic one. In both, the audience has resources to try to make 
sense of what the speaker said. They can reason the speaker made a 
slip, and try to fi gure out which word the speaker misarticulated, or 
conclude the speaker accidentally mistook a male for a female. They 
have to determine the logical form the speaker uttered, or try to make 
sense of the utterance, by identifying the speaker’s background false 
beliefs. (Note that, with Kripke (1977), we can still maintain that one 
can ‘speaker refer’, i.e., manage to convey that the male the speaker 
“had in mind” is happy (though Kripke doesn’t distinguish different 
sources of error). The audience can fi gure out that the speaker probably 
mistakenly used the female gender pronoun to refer to a man, and so 
fi gure out the message the speaker intended to convey. But even so, it 
is crucial to separate disambiguation from meaning (determination). 
Even if the speaker manages to convey the message she ultimately in-
tended, this is not because some new meaning is attached to “he”, just 
as, in the earlier example, it was not because some new meaning was 
assigned to “Godel”. It is rather because the audience can disambiguate 
the form the speaker either tokened but misarticulated, or should have 
tokened save for their erroneous belief that “she” is a male-gendered 
pronoun, in “He is happy”.)
What about our second question concerning successful application? 
What must speakers know or do in order for their uses of the common 
noun “water” to succeed in being about anything, and in particular, 
about water? Put differently, how is successful application achieved 
for uses of the common noun by speakers who are not neologizing the 
term—that is, ordinary folk in the same linguistic network?
According to the commonsensical view, competent speakers carry 
(clusters of) identifying or individuating criteria in their heads that 
they associate with a word (recall Dummett’s claims above). They suc-
ceed in talking about something, e.g., with uses of “water”, only if what-
ever is included among this stuff satisfi es (a cluster of) the criteria they 
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associate with “water”. This cluster is the meaning of the word. So con-
strued, what speakers must know in order to know the meaning of “wa-
ter”, and so, to fi x its extension, is something like: “whatever satisfi es 
“water” does so only if it is what fi lls our oceans and lakes and rivers, 
comes out of our taps, quenches our thirst, etc.”
Of course, not everyone agrees. After all, the information that inter-
locutors associate with the word “water” can be mistaken, or so incom-
plete it fails to separate what belongs to the extension of “water” from 
what does not (H2O vs XYZ), and yet, it seems, that successful applica-
tion of the use of the word might still result. As Evans reminds us, “We 
constantly use general terms of whose satisfaction conditions we have 
but the dimmest idea. “Microbiologist”, “chlorine” (the stuff in swim-
ming pools), “nicotine” (the stuff in cigarettes); these (and countless 
other words) we cannot defi ne nor offer remarks which would distin-
guish their meaning from that of closely related words” (Evans 1973). 
How is this possible?
A familiar response is that, just as through a practice of deference, 
ordinary folks can use the words they use, so too, through a practice of 
deference, they can exact successful application of their words as well. 
If this is correct, then neither the false nor insuffi cient information in 
our heads need thwart our successful application of uses of “water”. 
But, while appealing to deference is a common response, how should 
we understand this sort of deference; viz., deference to whom is rel-
evant? And how can a speaker’s deference to anyone help to secure the 
successful application of an expression, if (as we will maintain) no one 
need be any less mistaken or ill-informed than anyone else?
Here is where a division of labor often enters the discussion. The 
idea is that in order for there to be a successful application of a word, 
somebody in the network of users must know (a cluster of) necessary 
and suffi cient identifying or individuating conditions for what falls 
under extension of that word (see, e.g., Putnam 1975). This “expert” 
needn’t be the occurrent user who carries this information. Nor need 
it even be neologist who coined the term. For a concrete example, con-
sider “water”, where all that matters for successful application, on any 
occasion of use, is that whoever uses it defers to relevant experts about 
what “water” is true of, or at least about what the relevant individua-
tive nature (property) is of whatever “water” is true of. That is, there 
has to be some arbiter in possession of relevant knowledge to whom 
others defer. There has to be an expert.
To elaborate, suppose a speaker carries erroneous or incomplete 
lexical information about the application of “water”. The speaker has 
heard it used, but misremembered it as being about a liquid fl uid state, 
and so, rules out its gaseous and frozen forms, e.g., or doesn’t know 
enough to distinguish what it applies to from a range of other odorless, 
tasteless, thirst quenching liquids. Still, if exposed to the word, then, 
even though confused, or with incomplete knowledge about what it’s 
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true of, its uses can still successfully apply. (For instance, they can 
successfully say something false if they say “Water is always liquid”, 
or successfully make a request if they say “Give me a glass of water, 
please”.) According to the division of labor thesis, the speaker need only 
defer to experts on the meaning of “water” for its uses to be successfully 
applied. Putnam, an early advocate of the thesis writes:
We could hardly use such words as “elm” and “aluminum” if no one pos-
sessed a way of recognizing elm trees and aluminum metal......Everyone to 
whom gold is important for any reason has to acquire the word “gold”; but 
he does not have to acquire a method of recognizing if something is or is not 
gold. He can rely on a special subclass of speakers. (Putnam 1975)
A commitment to the linguistic division of labor means that a speaker 
cannot enter the network surrounding uses of a noun like “water” un-
less that speaker defers to “experts” on the meaning of “water” (or on 
which property it expresses). This is partly what it means to be lexi-
cally competent with the word “water”. What counts as an expert can 
vary from context to context. In some contexts, we may care more about 
underlying composition, and in others, more about functional relations. 
Different concerns may force us to change allegiances with respect to 
who the relevant experts are.
So understood, it should be clear that the neologist needn’t be an 
expert. While pointing at some stuff, a neologist may presume that 
that stuff, and whatever else “water” projects to, shares some prop-
erty in virtue of which all this stuff has the same composition, and so, 
thereby falls under the extension of “water”. But this does not require 
the individual to know what that property’s composition consists in. 
That individual may have erroneous or incomplete information about 
the denotation of “water”. However, the underlying assumption is that 
there are experts somewhere in the network who have identifying or 
individuating information, and community’s deference to them is re-
quired (though not suffi cient) to account for successful uses of “water”.
But why do we need experts? No matter how ignorant or misin-
formed anyone, or everyone, in the network is, including whoever ne-
ologized the expression, successful predication can still ensue. (Clearly, 
we can introduce a term labeling a poorly understood phenomenon, 
only to learn about the phenomenon later on, with the understanding 
that we possibly might never master it.) Indeed, Putnam’s own para-
digmatic example of “water” as used in 1750 is revealing in exactly this 
respect. Putnam writes (1975):
In 1750, chemistry was not developed suffi ciently to individuate what we 
call “water” from all other chemical compounds. No one knew about hydro-
gen and oxygen compounds. Still, when speakers used “water,” they suc-
ceeded in picking out what we pick out with current uses. That’s why it 
makes sense to say they were wrong about what their uses of “water” ap-
plied to, even though these uses still succeeded in picking out water and 
only water. In short, that’s why we can say that we disagree with them 
about water.
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How can Putnam reconcile these intuitions with the division of labor 
thesis? How can membership in the network require a division of labor 
if all past and present users of the term can be wrong about the compo-
sition of its extension? Putnam (1975) attempts to remain committed 
to linguistic division of labor, even in face of his own “water” counter-
examples. He suggests that even in 1750 speakers were deferring to 
experts, just not past or contemporaneous ones; rather, future ones. 
(Mysterious!)
So, what can we conclude in the cases of an absence of experts? 
After all, there may never be an expert, even in principle, among mem-
bers of our species—if that requires someone who uncovers the nature 
of the extension of “water”. And if the world ended before there were 
an expert, it’s not like everyone would have failed to talk about water.12 
So, what did Putnam intend; is it just a metaphor for the nature of 
things? Since there is a fact of the matter about the nature of whatever 
“water” picks out, it follows that, even though no science may ever un-
cover this nature, we can still imagine an omniscient expert who knows 
all natures.
The problem for Putnam with this suggestion is that it doesn’t ex-
ploit the expert to determine what “water” picks out. It uses the fact 
the “water” is true of something-or-other, to determine what it would 
take to be an expert about that. In particular, this way of exploiting 
expertise doesn’t require that anyone actually “possesses a way of rec-
ognizing” whether “water” is true of something, at least not anyone in 
our network (even considered diachronically).
The key idea here is that once the connection between a common 
noun and its denotation has been established (say, e.g., for “water”), 
it becomes explorable as to what the nature is of what is picked out 
by uses of the noun. And though, in some cases, there may be experts 
about the nature of this property, and though we may defer to them, 
there is no guarantee that such experts (ever will) exist. But no such 
guarantee seems necessary in order to secure successful uses of expres-
sions of our language. So, if in order to successfully use a common noun 
a speaker must defer, then to whom must the speaker defer with a use 
of “water”, if not to knowledgeable experts about the nature of what’s 
in its extension?
Well, on our story, once again, we are assuming that the speaker 
who introduced the term somehow managed to fi x its meaning, and 
so, its extension. We deny that this speaker did so solely by explicitly 
intending to pick out some particular sort of stuff or property, since this 
fi rst speaker was almost certainly wrong about the extension of “water” 
as well as about nature of its extension, and so might have been every 
user of the word since. One way around this is just to say the speaker 
12 Does the move to context-specifi c experts help here? We do not see how. For 
one, just as there is no guarantee that there is an expert with respect to the nature 
of a property, there’s no guarantee there is an expert with respect to the property 
relative to some contextually specifi ed purpose we are interested in.
 U. Stojnić and E. Lepore, Expressions and their Articulations 493
intended to pick out that thing, where “that thing” is whatever is the 
thing that’s being actually picked out (if any). Such demonstrative in-
tentions are cheap (easy to form), but they don’t provide a rich body of 
information to be used in identifi cation.
This brings us to our answer to the second question about the suc-
cessful use of predicates. Accordingly, suppose a progenitor succeeded, 
despite an abundance of erroneous and/or incomplete information, in 
introducing a new expression and in fi xing its meaning/extension. A 
network got initiated, where upon all future users of the word can defer 
(de facto) to a chain of speakers back to its initial application ceremony. 
As before, this requires no intentional act of deference on the part of the 
speaker. All the speaker needs to do is intend to select an expression 
from her mental lexicon. The expression’s identity, and its meaning, is 
determined by de facto deference to the network. And so, the answer 
to the second question is just as with the answer to the fi rst question
 
about expression tokening; namely, it’s what speakers do, not what 
they know, that enables them to apply words successfully. A speaker 
selects an expression in her (mental) lexicon. In selecting this expres-
sion, she de facto defers to whomever passed the expression on to her. 
This doesn’t require the speaker or the introducer to be experts or pos-
sess any identifying information, or even that the speaker forms an 
intention to defer to anyone (including experts).
4. How far does the account extend?
So far, we have speculated about proper names like “Godel” and com-
mon nouns for natural kinds like “water”; but how far can the network 
model be pushed? Defending his own version of the network model, 
Burge (1979) argues it has “an extremely wide application,” and it does 
not depend on the kinds of words, say, that “Godel” and “water” are.13 
Indeed, he writes, the network extends to “an artifact term, an ordi-
nary natural kind word, a color adjective, a social role term, a term for 
a historical style, an abstract noun, an action verb, a physical move-
ment verb, or any of various other sorts of words” (1979). In fact, Burge 
is clear that the network extends to “any case where it is intuitively 
possible to attribute a mental state or event whose content involves a 
notion that the subject incompletely understands” (1979). Similarly, 
Putnam (1975), though he highlighted natural kind terms, notes that 
deference is practiced with many other kinds of words as well.
13 Arguably, Burge would disagree with our non-intentional way of characterizing 
deference. As explained earlier, throughout most of the literature, it has been 
assumed that the appropriate kind of deference requires at least an intention to 
defer. If we are right, even this requirement is too strong. Be that as it may, since our 
argument crucially relies only on the possibility of ignorance of, and error about, an 
expression’s articulation and its meaning, then whenever we have a case of apparent 
successful use of a term in spite of the possibility of such ignorance and error, our 
account will equally extend.
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But given our view of deference, how far does the network model 
extend? We think the arguments from ignorance and error extend to 
most (all?) expressions. Clearly, the distinction between expressions 
and their articulations extends to all expressions. And it seems that, 
for any expression, a speaker can be mistaken about, or ignorant about 
its articulation. On our account, tokening any expression requires 
simply selecting it from a mental lexicon. Potential ignorance or error 
about its identity or articulation are no obstacle to successful token-
ings; the expression is individuate by de facto deference to the token-
ing which introduced it into the speakers mental lexicon. Further, we 
think likewise, for virtually any expression the speaker can success-
fully use it—apply it—regardless of their ignorance or error about their 
meaning. We have seen how this extends to names and predicates. We 
think they quite generally, indeed even to connectives. Think about the 
debate over the meaning and logic of a conditional (cf. Grice (1989a), 
McGee (1985)) or the issues concerning commutativity of a conjunction 
in English.14 Surely, it is not an obstacle to the successful tokening or 
application of the English conditional, or conjunction, that one might 
be mistaken about, or even have false beliefs about, some of the infer-
ences that the conditional licenses. While establishing these extensions 
and what are their virtues in full is something we attempt elsewhere 
(Stojnić and Lepore, ms), here we note that, as long as the arguments 
from ignorance and error extend to a class of expressions, it should be 
clear, so do our answers to (1) and (2).
Conclusion
As sated at the outset, our goals here have been modest. We argued 
for an account of linguistic deference understood not as an intentional 
mental act—underscored by an intention to defer—but rather as what 
we called de facto deference—deference as a matter of historical and 
causal connections that trace the way the linguistic item was intro-
duced into the speaker’s mental lexicon. This allowed us to elucidate 
how speakers can successfully token and apply expressions despite the 
fact that they might be ignorant, or confused about the expressions’ 
articulation and meaning. To token an expression, and to apply it suc-
cessfully, speakers don’t have to know anything; they rather have to 
do something: they have to select an item from their mental lexicon 
in forming their utterance. Which item it is that is selected, in turn is 
determined by the de facto deference to the item that was tokened by 
whomever introduced the speaker to the word. Similarly, its meaning is 
determined by de facto deference to whomever introduced the speaker 
to the word (and so on, back to the neologizing event). This way of indi-
14 Some argue that apparent failures of commutativity are due to pragmatic effects 
(e.g., Grice (1989b)); the proponents of the dynamic semantics for conjunction, in 
turn, typically argue for a non-commutative meaning for “and” (see, e.g. Groenendijk 
and Stokhof (1991), or Heim (1982)).
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viduating expressions not only explains how one can successfully token 
and apply a term, despite potential ignorance and error, but allows us 
to carefully distinguish the interpretive task of disambiguation—the 
process whereby audience determines which term was uttered—from 
the metaphysical process of meaning determination. We take this to be 
a theoretical virtue of our account.
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